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This factsheet gives answers on how climate exacerbates root causes of conflict in Mali, using an 
impact pathway analysis. Three main impact pathways are identified: 
1. Resource availability and livelihood insecurity: The climate crisis is likely to impact resource 
availability and environmental conditions, strongly impacting climate-sensitive livelihoods and 
potentially contribute to the increasing competition over the use and access over land and water 
resources between and among different livelihoods groups as well as incrementing the prospects for 
the recruitment of NSAGs; 
2. Farmer-herder conflict: The increasing variability of climate and the rise in the number of extreme 
weather events such as droughts and floods are likely to undermine both agricultural and livestock 
production and productivity while also altering pastoralist grazing routes which can trigger various 
disputes between farmers and herders; 
3. Mobility and resource competition in the South: The increasing number of extreme weather 
events such as droughts and floods is likely to exacerbate and alter migration trends towards the 
South which may increase competition over natural resources and create conflicts between migrants 
and host communities.
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This publication is part of a factsheet series reporting on the findings of the CGIAR FOCUS Climate 
Security Observatory work in Africa (Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe). 
The research is centered around 5 questions*:  
How does climate exacerbate root causes of conflict? 
Impact pathways 
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Econometric analysis 
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Scopus analysis** 
Where are the climate insecurities hotspots? 
Spatial analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict, 
and socio-economic system? 
Network analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Are climate and security policies coherent and integrated? 
Policy coherence analysis
Are policy makers aware of the climate security nexus?
Social media analysis
Kenya   Mali   Nigeria   Senegal   Sudan   Uganda   Zimbabwe
Click on the links above to view the other Factsheets 
* Questions 1, 2, 3, 5 are analyzed at country level through a Climate Risk Lens (impact pathways, economic, spatial, network and social 
media analyses). The policy coherence and scopus analyses are at continental level.
**Scopus is one of the largest curated abstract and citation databases, with a wide global and regional coverage of scientific journals, 
conference proceedings, and books. We used Scopus data for analyzing: (1) how global climate research addresses the dynamics 
between climate, socio-economic factors, and conflict, and (2) how the countries studied are represented in the database. 
© 2021 CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security. 
This is an open-access document distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which 
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source 
are credited. 
The views expressed in this document cannot be taken to reflect the official position of the CGIAR or its donor agen-
cies. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report do not imply the expression of any 
opinion on the part of CGIAR concerning the legal status of any country, territory, area, city or area or of its authorities, 
or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in this document cannot be taken 
to reflect the official position of the CGIAR or its donor agencies.
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PATHWAY#1:  
Resource availability and livelihood insecurity
1. Climate change and variability have the potential to impact resource availability and 
environmental conditions, strongly impacting climate-sensitive livelihoods such as agriculture, 
livestock, and fishing. Changes in climate, along with other factors such as population growth, 
migration, environmental degradation, and the poor management of resources as well as land-
grabbing, rent-seeking, and power dynamics, can contribute to increasing the competition 
over the use and access over land and water resources, reducing levels of social cohesion, and 
increasing conflicts between and among different livelihood groups. 
2. The impact of climate change and variability on resource availability and environmental 
conditions that strongly impact climate-sensitive livelihoods can also increase local grievances, 
incrementing prospects for the recruitment of NSAGs who offer an economic opportunity to 
the vulnerable local population affected by poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity.
PATHWAY#2:  
Farmer-herder conflict 
The increasing variability in climate and the rise in the number of extreme weather events, 
including droughts and floods, will further impact land, water, and food systems, decreasing 
both agricultural and livestock production and productivity. These changes will particularly 
impact pastoralists because of the reduced pasture and water availability which forces them 
to change the timing and direction of their usual routes. These changes can trigger various 
disputes between farmers and herders, especially in the southern regions where there is a 
general lack of demarcated livestock corridors and pastureland with access to water sources.
PATHWAY#3:  
Mobility and resource competition in the South  
The increasing climate variability and a rise in the number of extreme weather events such as 
droughts and floods will contribute to exacerbating and altering migration trends. Seasonal and 
circular migration from the central and northern regions towards the South, a typical resilience 
strategy, is changing towards a more permanent migration influenced by increasing levels of 
violence and insecurity which strongly undermines the capacity to adapt and mitigate the 
effects of the climate crisis. The new type of migration and the influx of IDPs, along with existing 
high population growth, environmental degradation, and other socio-economic factors, may 
increase competition over natural resources and create conflict between migrants and host 
communities in the South.
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1 Including empires such as the Ghana, Mali, Songhay or Macina Empire, kingdoms such as the Kénédougou or the Kingdom of 
Ségou as well as small confederations such as the Kel Adagh and the Kel Ataram (IMRAP and Interpeace, 2015; Mongay Font and 
Meneses, 2010; Ki-Zerbo, 2011).
1. OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The Impact Pathway Analysis (IPA) aims to identify, describe, and represent the complex and non-
linear interactions between climate, conflict, and existing vulnerabilities and risks with a special focus 
on food, land, and water systems. In particular, the IPA intends to address the following questions:
• What are the potential climate security pathways through which climate may act as a threat 
multiplier?
• Which specific vulnerabilities and risks, that are at the heart of insecurity and conflict, may be 
exacerbated by the climate crisis?
• How can dimensions such as natural resources, livelihoods, mobility, governance and food, land, and 
water systems, inform climate security pathways in specific contexts?
2. METHODS AND DATA 
The IPA follows a systematic literature search and review to find, collate, analyze and synthesize insights 
from relevant knowledge products, including reports, policy briefs, fact sheets from grey literature, 
as well as books, journal articles, and other sources of documented evidence in academic literature 
and public media. The construction of a narrative is then followed by consultation with a designated 
set of experts and stakeholders through interviews and written feedback to gather evaluation and 
incorporate suggested revisions. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Political and institutional risks 
The effects of the climate crisis will impact an extremely fragile context characterized by armed 
conflict and strong political and socio-economic vulnerabilities. Since achieving its independence in 
1960, Mali experienced three decades of authoritarian rule, including the socialist regime of Modibo 
Keita as well as the military regime of Moussa Traoré, followed by three decades of democratic rule 
since the 1991 revolution established a multi-party system (IMRAP and Interpeace 2015). Despite 
the democratic progress, the government and the state institutions continued to be marked by 
corruption, weak governance, and centralized rule (Bastagli and Toulmin 2014). 
Mali is home to many different ethnic groups and communities, including the Bambara, the Malinke, 
the Songhay, the Fulani, the Soninke, the Arabs, and the Tuareg. In different times of history, these 
groups have created and run different autonomous political structures in part of the current territory 
of Mali1 and despite the interaction, association, and exchanges between the different ethnic groups, 
each community has preserved many elements of its cultural heritage, including languages, customs, 
and traditions which are now embedded within the rich ethnocultural mosaic of the Malian society 
and state (IMRAP and Interpeace 2015; Ki-Zerbo 2011). The French colonial rule, as well as the different 
post-colonial governments, were responsible for exacerbating historical tensions between the North 
and the South, introducing regional disparities and grievances that were particularly felt by the 
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Arabs and the Tuareg whose livelihood was increasingly undermined while being economically and 
politically marginalized (Chauzal and van Damme 2015; Hegazi et al. 2021; Mongay Font and Meneses 
2002). These grievances eventually led to tensions against the French colonial power first and to a 
series of recurring armed insurrections in 1963, 1991, 2006, and, the most recent one, 2012 (Chauzal and 
van Damme 2015; Kone 2017). 
3.2 Pre-existing conflict and security risks  
In 2012 Mali witnessed an upsurge of the armed conflict with a new Tuareg rebellion followed by a 
proliferation of armed groups, including secessionist and jihadist movements, among others (Lecocq 
and Klute 2019; Hegazi et al. 2021). The intensification of the armed conflict has critically damaged the 
Malian economy and society, worsening socio-economic and political vulnerabilities that were already 
present and that are part of the root causes of the conflict such as poverty, food insecurity, economic 
and political marginalization, and regional inequalities (WFP 2020; World Bank 2015; Bastagli and 
Toulmin 2014; NUPI and SIPRI 2021). Despite the economic growth, the job market is characterized by 
high informality, low wages, and high unemployment, especially among the youth which creates the 
conditions for the recruitment of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) (Bastagli and Toulmin 2014; Théroux-
Bénoni et al. 2016). The conflict context and the proliferation of NSAGs has helped to strengthen and 
enlarge illicit economy and criminal activities which go from the contraband of fuel, manufactured 
goods, and foodstuffs to human, drugs, and arms trafficking. While being a source of livelihood for 
some people that lack of economic alternatives, illicit economies have a highly destabilizing effect, 
providing a source of income for NSAGs and accentuating existing vulnerabilities (Tinti 2014; Bastagli 
and Toulmin 2014). More recently, the instability of the country has further increased with the 2020 
and the 2021 military coups that have been condemned by the international community (Ahmed and 
Petesch 2020). 
3.3 Socio-economic risks 
Despite the notable economic growth, Mali still suffers from poverty and food insecurity. Around 78% 
of its population lives in poverty – 47% of the total population lives in extreme poverty – and 18% 
of the citizens suffer from food insecurity which particularly affects the North and central regions 
(World Bank 2021; WFP 2020; WFP 2021). Meanwhile, with one of the highest population growth rates 
in the world, the population is likely to continue growing. The total population of Mali has increased 
from 5.3 million in 1960 to 20.3 million in 2020 and it is projected to reach 27 million by 2030 and 44 
million by 2050 (UNFPA 2020). This is likely to put additional stress on natural resources and contribute 
to environmental degradation (Nagarajan 2020; UNFPA 2020). Taking into consideration population 
growth estimates, per capita water availability is estimated to suffer a 77% decline by 2080 (Tomalka 
et al. 2020).
3.4 Climate exposure and impacts
Mali is a landlocked country that is part of the Sahel, one of the most climate-vulnerable regions in 
the world. It is highly vulnerable to climate disruptions while having a low level of readiness (University 
of Notre Dame 2019). However, the exposure and vulnerability vary across the country where we can 
find three main climate zones, including the desertic North which is part of the Sahara Desert, the 
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Sahelian centre which has a relatively dry climate, and the Sudanian South which annually receives 
around 1,400mm of rainfall (Ministre de l’Environnement, de l’Assanissement et du Développement 
Durable 2017). 
Changes in climatic conditions are not something new in Mali. Since 1960 there has been an overall 
increase in annual temperature of 0.7°C. The country has experienced five major drought episodes 
between 1987 and 2007 as well as devastating flood events (USAID 2018). However, this trend is likely 
to accelerate in the future with increasing climate variability and a rise in the number of extreme 
weather events, including droughts and floods (Ministre de l’Environnement, de l’Assanissement et du 
Développement Durable 2017; USAID 2018; Nagarajan 2020). Temperatures are estimated to increase 
between 1.4°C and 2.05°C by 2050 while annual precipitations are projected to decline between 2.5% 
and 12.5% by 2050. In this case, a decrease of more than 10% in annual rainfall would entail a drought 
episode for the country (Ministre de l’Environnement, de l’Assanissement et du Développement 
Durable 2017).
These changes in climate are likely to severely impact the Malian economy and society which is 
extremely dependent on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and 
forestry (Ministre de l’Environnement, de l’Assanissement et du Développement Durable 2017; FAO 
2021). Agriculture and livestock alone employ nearly 80% of the workforce and accounts for 40% 
of the GDP and around 75% of the exports (Ministre de l’Environnement, de l’Assanissement et du 
Développement Durable 2017). 
Impact on agriculture
The combined effect of a rise in temperatures and rainfall variability is likely to result in reduced yields 
in the foreseeable future (USAID 2018; USAID 2019). Some staple crops such as millet, sorghum, and 
maize as well as some cash crops such as cotton will see their productivity reduced (USAID 2019; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2018). This is particularly worrisome considering that 
95% of Malian agriculture – mostly subsistence farming – is rainfed, making it extremely vulnerable to 
climate variability (USAID 2018). The overall effect of climate change and variability is likely to worsen 
food insecurity, malnutrition, poverty, and poor health (Nagarajan 2020; USAID 2019).
Impact on livestock
The effects of the climate crisis are likely to adversely impact the livestock industry, another key Malian 
economic sector that contributes to 7.9% of the GDP and is characterized by an extensive livestock 
system in which 75% of the livestock is part of transhumant herds (Ministre de l’Environnement, de 
l’Assanissement et du Développement Durable, 2018). The increase in temperatures and the decline 
in precipitations are projected to reduce livestock animal weight between 14 and 16% and decrease 
forage yields between 5 and 36% (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2018). Likewise, climate 
is also predicted to affect livestock by increasing the mortality and the prevalence of diseases in the 
animals as well as reducing livestock productivity. The outcome is likely to increase food insecurity, 
malnutrition, and poverty (Nagarajan 2020; USAID 2018).
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3.5. Climate security pathways
In this context, there are multiple pathways through which climate could act as a threat multiplier 
in Mali, exacerbating existing socio-economic risks and vulnerabilities and potentially aggravating 
instability, insecurity, and violence (Figure 1).
PATHWAY #1: Resource availability and livelihood insecurity
In the last decades, Mali has witnessed an increase in the competition over the access and use of 
natural resources by different livelihood groups. These groups are often associated with specific ethnic 
groups which has led to an overlap between conflict lines and the articulation of narratives that also 
draw from historical grievances of each ethnic group. For instance, there are considerable tensions 
between Tuareg and Fulani pastoralist communities over the control of pasture and water resources 
for their livestock (Nagarajan 2020). Fulani herders have also had confrontations with Dogon and 
Bambara farmers (Nagarajan 2020; Benjaminsen and Ba 2009; Hegazi et al. 2021). The Tuareg have 
had tensions with the Songhay farmer communities. The Tuareg have been historically associated 
with insecurity because of their raiding against sedentary communities such as the Songhay while 
these have been involved in forming government supported anti-Tuareg militias to fight the various 
Tuareg rebellions (Chauzal and van Damme 2015).
The uneven access to natural resources has often been cited as one of the main drivers of conflict 
between the different livelihood groups (Benjaminsen et al. 2012; Ursu 2018). The lack of governance 
and the presence of corruption which are at the heart of the poor management of resources that 
affect the different livelihood groups are also root causes of local conflict (Benjaminsen and Ba 
2009; Benjaminsen et al. 2012; Ursu 2018). The weakness of conflict resolution mechanisms is also a 
contributing factor to the conflict. While formal justice is perceived as costly, inefficient, and corrupt, 
customary justice imparted by local authorities such as the jowros and village chiefs lacks enforcement 
capacity to implement their verdicts party because of the insufficient support from the national 
government (Ursu 2018; Benjaminsen et al. 2012). The fragility of the state, the lack of governance, 
and the inability to provide justice and security has created mistrust towards the government in the 
central and northern regions where people tend to rely on smaller units of governance such as family, 
clan, ethnic group, and even armed groups to meet those needs (Ibrahim and Zapata 2018; Hegazi et 
al. 2021; Walch 2018).
Without adequate climate mitigation and adaptation strategies, the impact of the climate crisis may 
contribute to exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and risks by further reducing the availability of 
natural resources, undermining the production and productivity of land, water, and food systems in 
different ways.
Pathway #1.1: Increase in competition over access and use of natural resources
Climate change and variability have the potential to impact resource availability and environmental 
conditions, contributing to an increase in the competition over the use and access, reducing levels 
of social cohesion, and increasing conflicts between and among different groups (Nagarajan 2020; 
Raineri 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 2018; Tarif and Grand 2021; Ursu 2018). 
The changing climate impacts climate-sensitive livelihoods, including agriculture, livestock, and 
fishing, reducing their production and productivity (Nagarajan 2020; Ministre de l’Environnement, 
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Figure 1: Climate Security Pathways for Mali
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de l’Assanissement et du Développement Durable 2017). Climate conditions along with other factors 
such as population growth, migration, environmental degradation, and the poor management of 
resources as well as land-grabbing, rent-seeking, and power dynamics are also at the heart of the 
increasing conflict over land and water resources (Nagarajan 2020). Strengthening governance 
systems and conflict resolution mechanisms is crucial to administer natural resources and regulate 
their access and use (Raineri 2018). 
Pathway #1.2: Increase in the recruitment of NSAGs 
In Mali, violent conflict has undermined social cohesion, increased grievances, and curtailed livelihoods, 
paving the way for individuals to join NSAGs. Weak governance has translated into the inability to 
enforce efficient conflict resolution mechanisms and solve disputes over access to natural resources 
while NSAGs have seen their legitimacy increase, especially concerning justice and conflict resolution 
(Nagarajan 2020; Ursu 2018). Poverty, unemployment, and the overall lack of economic opportunities 
have also been identified as crucial drivers for the recruitment of NSAGs, who offer an economic 
opportunity to vulnerable local population (Hegazi et al. 2021; Théroux-Bénoni et al. 2016; UNDP 2017).
In recent literature, climate change has also been identified as a contributing factor to the recruitment 
of NSAGs mainly through its contribution to fragility and its impact on livelihoods that leave people in a 
more vulnerable situation (Nett and Rüttinger 2016). In the case of Mali, climate change and variability 
have impacted resource availability and increased competition over the access and use of natural 
resources which, in turn, undermines people’s livelihoods and increase local grievances, incrementing 
prospects for the recruitment of NSAGs (NUPI and SIPRI 2021; Hegazi et al. 2021). 
PATHWAY #2: Farmer–herder conflict 
Relations between farmers and herders in the past decades have been impacted by different factors 
which, altogether, have contributed to the increase of tensions. Pastoralists have historically remained 
in the northern regions during the rainy season and moved south towards the Inner Niger Delta 
during the dry season in search of fodder, particularly bourgou, a plant that grows on deep water in 
the Delta (Benjaminsen et al. 2012). However, in the past few decades, paddy fields for rice production 
have expanded to areas where bourgou used to grow (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009; Benjaminsen et 
al. 2012). The decrease in the water volume of the Delta in the 1970s and 1980s influenced by the 
droughts and the creation of the Sélingué Dam allowed the expansion of rice fields into bourgou 
areas (Benjaminsen and Ba 2009; Benjaminsen et al. 2012).
Tensions between both livelihood groups also augmented because of the expansion of farming 
into livestock corridors, obstructing the mobility of herders and hindering their access to essential 
natural resources such as water and fodder (Ibrahim and Zapata 2018; Benjaminsen and Ba 2009; 
Benjaminsen et al. 2012). In this scenario, some herders decide to take their livestock through farms in 
order to access water points which damages the crops and angers the farmers (Ibrahim and Zapata 
2018). Furthermore, violent conflict has forced herders to move away from the war-torn regions of 
Timbuktu and Gao towards the central regions, including the Inner Niger Delta, putting pressure on 
natural resources and increasing tensions with farmers communities (NUPI and SIPRI 2021).
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The increasing variability in climate and the rise in the number of extreme weather events, including 
droughts and floods, will further impact land, water, and food systems, decreasing both agricultural 
and livestock production and productivity (Ministre de l’Environnement, de l’Assanissement et du 
Développement Durable 2017). These changes will particularly impact pastoralist communities due to 
the reduced pasture and water availability that will further diminish the access of herders to essential 
natural resources. There will be an increasing mortality and prevalence of diseases in the animals 
and reduced livestock productivity (USAID 2018; Nagarajan 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands 2018). In an effort to cope with the changes in climate that mainly translated into a more 
severe dry season, pastoralist communities are forced to change their grazing routes in search of 
alternative resources while some farmers increment agricultural land, frequently at the expense of 
grazing areas (Ibrahim and Zapata 2018). This often leads to disputes between farmers and herders, 
especially in the southern regions where there is a general lack of demarcated livestock corridors and 
pastureland with access to water sources (Nagarajan 2020).
The increasing variability of climate has altered seasons, changing the timing of harvests and 
turning more unclear when pastoralists can move southwards with their herders to graze and access 
water sources (Nagarajan 2020). Likewise, harsh climate conditions with more severe dry seasons 
force pastoralists to move southwards earlier in search of pasture near the Inner Niger Delta. This 
becomes a real problem when animals arrive before the crops have been harvested as they damage 
crops, impacting farmers’ livelihoods and creating confrontations between both livelihood groups 
(Ibrahim and Zapata 2018). Without strengthening the coping capacity and the conflict resolution 
mechanisms, the increasing effects of the climate crisis are likely to continue impacting farmer and 
pastoralist communities in central and northern Mali who are already affected by a wide array of 
risks and vulnerabilities, contributing to the increase in farmer–herder conflicts (Ibrahim and Zapata 
2018; Hegazi et al. 2021; USAID 2018). In this regard, there are some interesting initiatives such as the 
strengthening of local conflict resolution mechanism that the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue has 
been developing since 2015 through which they support networks of community mediators to resolve 
conflict over the access to natural resources that often feed into broader inter-communal conflicts 
(Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2020).
PATHWAY #3: Mobility and resource competition in the South
Migration has been an essential aspect of the Malian society and economy. Seasonal and circular 
migration is a resilience strategy that has historically helped communities to cope with the changing 
effects of climate (Mitra 2017; Nagarajan 2020). During seasonal floods and droughts, people move 
southwards and then come back when environmental conditions have improved (Hegazi et al. 2021). 
For instance, one-third of the workforce seasonally migrates in search of jobs from rural areas in the 
Niger Delta towards urban centres in the South (UNEP 2011).
However, this trend is changing towards a more permanent migration to the Southern regions due 
to increasing political, socio-economic, and climate vulnerabilities that hinder livelihoods and forces 
people to migrate (Nagarajan 2020). For instance, the new cycle of violence experienced since 2018 
contributed to increment displacement (IOM 2017). In 2020, floods impacted the live of more than 
80,000 people, damaging around 6,000 houses (Hegazi et al. 2021). Land, water, and food systems 
are also heavily affected by the increasing changes in climate that reduces their production and 
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productivity and hinders different livelihood groups, including farmers, herders and fishermen 
(Nagarajan 2020). Overall, there are now more than 370,000 internally displaced persons (IDP)s in Mali 
(UNHCR 2021). The increasing climate variability and a rise in the number of extreme weather events, 
including droughts and floods, will contribute to exacerbate and alter migration trends (Ministre de 
l’Environnement, de l’Assanissement et du Développement Durable 2017; Nagarajan 2020). This trend 
has also been impacted by insecurity and violence levels in the central and northern regions which 
strongly undermines the capacity of communities and individuals as well as the state to adapt and 
mitigate the effects of climate change and variability (Ndaruzaniye et al. 2010; Stewart and Fitzgerald 
2001; Adger et al. 2014).
The new type of more permanent migration and the influx of IDPs, along with existing high population 
growth, environmental degradation, and other socio-economic factors, may increase competition 
over natural resources and create conflict between migrants and host communities in the South 
(Marquette 2020; Nagarajan 2020; Ursu 2018; Hegazi et al. 2021). Also, migration and, especially, forced 
displacement often leaves people in precarious and vulnerable situation which can render them 
more susceptible of exploitation and recruitment by NSAGs (Hegazi et al. 2021). Without the adequate 
mitigation and adaptation strategies that cope with the effects of climate change and socio-economic 
risks, conflicts between migrants and host communities are likely to take place (NUPI and SIPRI 2021).
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